It is perfectly understandable why both banks andvendors cut corners if they can: the costs of acompromise are widely spread. A bank that supplies its merchants with a cheap but easily-compromised
ped saves millions at once, while the cards compromised later will have been issued by many different institutions. The negligent bank does not face the full economic costs of its actions, and the lucky vendors had their product ª evaluatedº by banking organisations with little incentive to look hard for problems. The stakeholders wanted to believe the assurances they got from other stakeholders, and no one had an incentive to blow the whistle (except academics, who can be ignored for a while). Thus the level of investment in system security was much less than optimal.According to this expert, the government should step in http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/fraudfailures.pdf
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