There was a time that security and anti-terrorist specialists from all around the world took the IDF and Israeli security apparatus as an example. THis had some positive other commercial effects for its securityproducts and some sympathy and trust that would otherwise take years to aquicre. They are after all a small country surrounded by ennemies that untill some partial peace agreements wanted to destroy Israeli whenever it would show some weakness. The secret services are also romantized by the hunt for Black september (the killelrs of Munich) and by giving El Al the name of being one of the safest airlines to use (kidnapping and bombings). Off course some policies, atrocities and miscalculations have tarnished this professional image. But the effectiveness of its intelligence services was still more or less upheld.
This seems to be changing fast and very dramatically and in a sense may demand a total overhaul of these services.
First there was the Dubai live-on-cam assassination. THe physical assassination was successfull but the amateuristic preparation was pink panther like. THis kind of political-military assassintations only work for Israel if nobody can really proof that it was behind the operation. THere should be some deniability that is great enough to be able to keep even some doubt (especially if you don't want to give the terrorist-military wing of the Palestinian movements an argument to begin attacking Israel again during the start of negotiations about the start of negotiations)
Secondly and even more dramatically. It now looks like that there more than 2000 documents from 2005-2007 from the central office of the Secret Service of Israel were copied by a secretary before she left the office. About 700 of them are highly classified and can have repercussions on the international and national level. Some documents have also all the internal names and procedures and contacts. To make matters even worse, she handed them over to a journalist who used some of them to write some articles about things everybody knows but doesn't want to know (Israel has an assassinationpolicy against some Palsstinian movements). To make matters even more worse, Israel has let the journalist leave the country (he says he is in self-inflicted asylm in the UK) without being sure without any doubt that all thsoe documents are destroyed or handed over.The newspaper itself refuses to give the copies back to the secret service.
Just recap. We are talking about a SECRET service of a country that is still at war with some of its neighboring countries or territories and has a permanent real terror alert at, in and outside of its borders. THe intelligence service is an essential part to have the most actual information about threats and eventual real peace or no-fire possibilities.
A soldier who fullfilled her two years of military service as a secretary in the central office of the secret service has copied 2000 documents during two years to a special folder and has left the office with them copied on two discs. From one of probably the most secure buildings in Jeruzalem. She has been able to open and read 700 classified documents without any encryption or passwords (or had access to the keys and passwords).
It was also clear that she didn't agree with the policies of the secret service and the military. This is her good right, but it doesn't mean that the central office of the secret service should give her access to all those documents without any background check. There are also risks with using temporary personnel for such sensitive functions. A function is sensitive depending on the information you have access to, not the work you do. You may be a secretary but may have a more sensitive function because you have access to more important information than the officer you are working for and who has only access to his own files.
Sorry but if this is possible how can you call yourself a secret service ? How can any secret service or any person willing to give you information have any trust that their information will be secret or confidential at the least.
The only thing that still needs to happen to make the disaster complete is that they are published on wikileaks.com
Okay, some can say that we are three years later, but there is a lot that changes in three years and sometimes not that much. It still shows that the Israeli secret service is not what is has been (or maybe that was our image and not the reality)
Solution : look at Information or Data leakage prevention products or functionality. This means a document can not be copied or printed and can only be assessed by authorized people. And this would have send off alerts before harm could have been done.