The Greek drama is that because of the timid answers of the European Community and the nationalistic refusal of Greece to go directly to the IMF the crisis has been developing very fast. In a few days Greece has gone from a country that still found investors for its bonds on the private market to a country that is know said to be on the border of defaulting on its debts (which are junk bonds anyway - which will pose new questions about the solvability of some banks).
The drame of the Greek crisis is that Greece can't leave the Eurozone because the judicial and financial complications would be enormous and it isn't even sure that it would be a solution. So they have to stay in the Eurozone for better and for worse, but that ain't the way the other partners are seeing it (for the worse).
The drama for the Eurozone is that if Greece would default on its obligations and wouldn't be able or willing to pay some of these debts back, the domino-effect on other countries that are already in the limelight of speculators (and others that are on the borderline like Ireland and France) would increase enormously. The markets are like a rollercoaster, it goes up slowly but it goes down very fast.
So the Euro is losing some of its political power (as its position is more political than financial) but that is an double edged sword. A strong Euro is good when the price of oil is going up (as it is) but bad for exports. It is not clear how a lower Euro will play out with rising oil prices and an economic slow recovery. As inflation is going up in the Eurozone, the debate between the proponents of an anti-inflationary monetarian policy and those that want to accept some inflation (up to 4% according to the IMF) will flare up again - or won't it (because everything is decided in small circles without much democratic oversight and debate). You can't have it both ways.
If the Eurozone decides to follow the anti-inflation doctrine with a strong internatonal Euro in a very weak economic recovery (in the Eurozone) than the consequence will be that the so-called socialsecurity states will become under enormous pressure to lower the wages, cut social welfare and healthcare with the social unrest that will follow.
Even if one says that one needs the strong Euro to give the industry a defense against the rising oil price, than one has to take into account that at the same time these enterprises have trouble exporting outside of Europe because of the strong Euro. Instead of just using this argument one should proof that it is an effective one and study it in the whole economic context, not just in a dogmatic way.
The small Belgian secret is that even if the country is now going through a political crisis, there is a real financial crisis looming if the parties can't find an agreement about how to reform the financing of the federal state (responsable for the social security, army and stuff like that) and the regions (more or less responsable for the rest) after the election. Now the regions get so much money from the federal state that in a few years time the federal state won't have enough money to finance the social security (pensions and stuff like that). If that ain't a dirty little secret, I don't know.
It also shows the irresponsability of our leaders nowadays. Even when walls come stumbling down in the Eurozone.