stratfor : the private CIA proxy loses everything and sends thousands running for cover

when Anonymous activists hacked the servers of Stratfor they couldn't know that they had hit the jackpot

it is the mother of all private intelligence companies that just as the private army industry was beginning to spread its wings into every corner and aspect of the international policial, military and economic aspects (and through a side- aspect trying to make lots of money by using it on the stockmarket - if this ain't abuse of knowledge (imagine the CIA playing on the stockmarket and making money because it knows things that are going to happen)

and so Wikileaks has found a second life

after the publication of the nearly one million accounts and information about its users (making it the most important breach anytime because they were nearly all contacts with access to high level networks and services)

the whole database of 5 million emails has begun - in parts

and it is really amazing stuff

http://wikileaks.org/gifiles and you can download all 5 million of them at once (26 Giga of files) and if the mails already published are representative, this is the biggest security breach of all times - can you imagine the thousands of sources all over the world - of which some were paid through swiss bankaccounts - who are now having to

* explain all this to their colleagues

* take their bags, their family and leave immediately before the secret service of their country has downloaded and analysed all these files and found their names (yes those amateurs gave full names and functions of all their sources in these unencrypted mails)

* people who will lose their jobs, their social influence, their reputation, their access and the trust of many - even if they were more manipulated than they seemed aware off - and even if not everybody has the necessary intelligence to look through flatter, dinners, speaking engagements and intellectual exchanges between analysts (some wiser people became very cautious when they began to understand that the firm had privileged links to the US Intelligence and military community (as they call it now))

In some of the files released today you read really stuff and language you only read in CIA training material (or any other spook(y) organisation)

If this is a source you suspect may have value, you have to take control od him. Control means financial, sexual or psychological control to the point where he would reveal his sourcing and be tasked. This is difficult to do when you are known to be affiliated with an intelligence organization. The decision on approach would not come from you but from your handler. This is because you're position is too close to the source and your judgment by definition suspect. Each meeting would be planned between you and your handler and each meeting would have a specific goal not built around discussing the topic of interest which would ideally be hidden but in analyzing him personally and moving toward control.
The justification for the op would be specific classes of information and on gaining control the first step would be determining his access. If he failed the test contact would be terminated.

the problem of analysts in the field is that they tend to want to discuss the topic, which raises the targets awareness, rather than focus on establishing the control relationship.

So from a professional point of view this target knows your affiliation, understands your interests and you have not established any control which is defined as a high confidence in his obedience
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/202526_re-insight-venezuela-update-on-chavez-s-health-power.html

and than if you read another mail, you read that someone went to a Turkish conference and during that conference established a lot of 'useful' contacts high in the military or in business circles

so this is not an organisation that is analyzing all the incoming information or trying to organise the discussion and input about information and analysis but this is a spyfirm infiltrating with the soft and corrupt approach in all kinds of institutions and business and trying to get as much as possible valuable information out of its 'handled' contacts and reselling it to their customers and/or use for their investments

but here is all out

all their contacts, all their strategies and thoughts, the way they handle people and the real way they think about people

the careers and securitypositions and access of tens of thousands of people is at risk here

they have shown themselves to be not secretive enough to give them access to any confidential information

let it be a lesson to all others with access to confidential information or knowledge

every analyst calling you may be really a spook or spy

it is all in a name, but sometimes it is just newspeak

you expect that a company that is working in the intelligence and securitybusiness and handles hundreds of secrets on a dialy basis was doing enough to keep them secured

shows you the importance of encryption, archiving and double authentification

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