There is a big story about compromised chips that have a hardware backdoor in it and that are used in thousands of military and critical installations. The story is no hype and it is not new, but it is one of the most important discoveries and it can have an important impact if it is played out in a certain way.
It has been discovered by persistent research by security researchers.
The backdoor has been installed and can not be removed, one has to remove the chip.
The chip is present in thousands of installations.
Things to do
Cut any networked internet access to any of your machines that have these chips.
If you don't want any stuxnettype incident only your own hardened portables should be used to access those machines and someone of your own ITsecurity department should be present when someone accesses it
Why is this important
A few years ago there was another big story because the NSA thought that she had discovered routers that were backdoored by the Chinese - so the story goes - enabling them to intercept anything that passes through. The US military and security organisations have also together with Microsoft and several other American hardware vendors worked together on initiatives about secure and trusted hardware. Nothing is secure if not everything is secure (and hardware security is becoming even more important as we are having a better code and networksecurity). This effectively proves their point.
But the military and security agencies have as public agencies also been subject to the national laws about the accessability of their purchases for international firms or products that were not produced totally in the US and sometimes the price of the offer was much more important than the other guarantees that had to be given. The military and those agencies (and probably critical infrastructure) did some economies but in the long end they lost control over the products and the maintenance guarantees. Voices in those circles are asking since long to make specific exceptions for specific hardware and software that have to be bought by those institutions and infrastructure.
At the same time, economists and politicians in Europe and the US are debating fiercefully for a re-industralisation of their continents and not importing nearly everything from China and other countries. As the Chips were delivered by an American firm but produced in Taiwan to be repackaged in China, Vietnam and Korea the argument goes that if those chips would have been produced in the US under special protection this would probably not have happened (that easily).
So if the military industrial complex, the Itsecurity industry, the hardware industry and the re-industralisationists would find each other in this battle to have our own router, chip and ITinfrastructure industry in Europe and the US with very strict security and quality rules and in with the critical infrastructure would be obliged to buy their infrastructure (that would cost more than the cheap Chinese produced material but that has been proven to be 'backdoored' and so 'totally unsafe to use') this would open a whole new set of opportunities.