The secret network TOR has two uses that makes adversaries of both kinds of users and that kind of battle for the control over TOR is even more important that loyalty to the organisation or the country because both sides claim that they are working each (against each other) in the interests of the organisation and the country.
The first are the researchers or watchers who want to spy and control by having access to everything that is being said by a specific target or Inside whole communities or countries. When they feel they don't have (instant) access than they feel frustrated and they will do everything that is possible to have some kind of access to those forms of communication. They will only be happy when they have access to anything we have said or written at some time in our history. Tor is for them just another communication network that has to be controlled and tapped by whatever means possible.
The other group are the opératives and controllers who work with people who work Inside organisations and who don't only give information about what is being said outside communication channels but also can warn before actions take place and give some context to information that has been picked by the watchers. To secure the confidentiality of their spies those controllers love TOR because it is a rather cheap way of giving some protection that would otherwise be in most of the countries targeted by the western intelligence services rather impossible to give without setting off alarms. They want to preserve TOR as a secure anonymous means of communication even if their own organisation - like the intelligence organisations in their target countries - are finding ways to break or even demolish the anonimity of the users of TOR
So it is no Wonder that the TOR maintainers receive Inside information from those organisations about the newest exploits and methods that are used to crack the anonimity of their network and software.
But they shouldn't use this as an excuse to have no fundemental discussion about two aspects of the TOR project.
1. This is the most important one in my eyes because you need to resolve this one if you want to facilitate the second one.
Is Tor to be used to host pédophiles, drug smugglers and all kinds of illegal criminal activity or is TOR something that was set up to give us some anonimity while surfing the web and protecting democratic oppositional activism online ?
Because if you decide that TOR has to be cleaned of those pédophiles and that illegal criminal activities shouldn't be hosted on TOR servers (even if they would be on the internet as simeple websites and as such would still be accessable with TOR) than much of the debate and the counterpropaganda in the press would stop.
You could set up a 'go away and stay away' Policy in which you would give public or private services which are clearly criminal (I am not talking about wikileaks but drugs, weapons, forged documents and pédophiles) a short Amnesty period to clear off and have a Policy in which TOR will 'blackwhole' or 'blacklist' hosters or sites that continue or set up such non-political criminal services (which are criminal in the whole world)
2. Is it time to invest in TOR by public institutions or private organisations as has to be done into Openssl to be sure that it doesn't depend on some volunteers or the lonely paid programmer to update and secure the network and the software
It is clear that some substantial investments have to be made on a permanent basis for TOR to stay ahead of the attacks and vulnerability research against its code which guarantee the anonimity of its users. But by its libertarian way of treating its services and users (as if everyone is responsable only to itself as if there is no society) it is making it nearly impossible for public or private organisations to foresee a steadily investment without the possiblitiy of legal and PR problems.
It makes it also too easy for the police, the spies and the dictators everywhere to make their case when they want to spend millions into cracking TOR 'to get pédophiles and drug smugglers'. THe rights of political dissidens, whistleblowers and activists is much more important that the business of pédophiles and drug smugglers and if those two pose an immediate danger to make it much harder to protect the democratic activitst or to limit the possibilities of dictators to control completely the flow of information than that shouldn't be hard choice - if you think an open society and a democratic state are more important than some corrupt criminal elements.
3. The only alternative is to make a new TOR that would only host political information and would not be used for non-political criminal activities